Communicating with Capital Juries: How Life
Versus Death Decisions Are Made, What
Persuades, and How to Most Effectively
Communicate the Need for a
Verdict of Life by Whitman, Melissa E.
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 11 | Issue 2 Article 5
Spring 3-1-1999
Communicating with Capital Juries: How Life
Versus Death Decisions Are Made, What
Persuades, and How to Most Effectively
Communicate the Need for a Verdict of Life
Melissa E. Whitman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Melissa E. Whitman, Communicating with Capital Juries: How Life Versus Death Decisions Are Made, What Persuades, and How to Most
Effectively Communicate the Need for a Verdict of Life, 11 Cap. DEF J. 263 (1999).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol11/iss2/5
Communicating with Capital Juries: How Life
Versus Death Decisions Are Made, What
Persuades, and How to Most Effectively




It is common knowledge in the legal community that the characteristics
of those who sit on the jury can be as important, if not more important,
than the strength of a case. This fact has been recognized as particularly
important in the criminal context, and much attention has been brought to
the importance of effective voir dire in determining the predispositions of
potential jurors.
Another aspect of the jury process that has received considerable
attention is that of how juries make their decisions. Nowhere is it more
important for a lawyer to be aware of conclusions that have been drawn on
this topic than in the context of a death penalty trial, for it is there that such
understanding can become literally a matter of life and death.
In recent years, a number of researchers in the fields of both law and
psychology have conducted studies attempting to shed light on how capital
juries think and process information. The most prominent and ambitious
of these studies were a part of the Capital Jury Project, a federally funded
endeavor that sought to understand more fully how capital juries think
about a variety of issues. One of the most salient features of these studies,
and what makes them dependable and important, was the fact that the
research was conducted with real jurors who heard real capital cases, rather
than with mock jurors in an artificial setting.
What these studies have shown can help criminal defense attorneys
understand more completely the effect their strategies have upon jurors.
* J.D. Candidate, May 1999, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.A.,
University of Pennsylvania. Many thanks to Professors Geimer and White for their
unwavering guidance and support.
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They may also suggest ways the strategies may be amended to become more
effective.
This article will summarize the major findings of recent studies and
analyses and show how they can be applied to individual trial strategies to
insure that capital defendants in Virginia receive the most effective represen-
tation possible.
HI. How Life and Death Decisions are Made
A. The Responsibility Issue
The decision whether to impose the sentence of death is undoubtedly
a weighty one in the minds of all capital jurors. Nowhere else in our society
is a citizen asked to take on such awesome responsibility. One commenta-
tor concluded that the Capital Jury Project has shown that "a key factor in
life versus death decisions in capital cases is the degree of responsibility
taken by the various participants," most importantly, by jurors themselves.'
This commentator also concluded that the research has shown that it is safe
to make at least two assumptions about responsibility in regard to capital
jurors (1) that perceived responsibility affects decision making and (2) that
the greater the perceived responsibility, the less likely it becomes that the
juror will choose death.
1. Denial of Responsibility ifat All Possible
In a study conducted by Joseph L. Hoffman, the question confronted
was that of whether jurors "are prone to abdicate their personal moral
responsibility for the death sentencing decision," by artificially distancing
themselves from the decision in a variety of ways The evidence showed
that "most jurors found ways to overcome, or avoid confronting, their sense
of personal moral responsibility for the defendant's fate."3 The jurors
examined accomplished this goal in a variety of ways, including appealing
to God for guidance, turning to alcohol, and misinterpreting the judge's
instructions to mean that "the law" compelled a given outcome.4 This
particular study was conducted in Indiana, a state in which the jury makes
a "recommendation" of death to the trial judge rather than a "verdict," as is
done in Virginia.' Many jurors convinced themselves that their decisions of
1. Steven J. Sherman, The Capital Jury Project: The Role of Responsibility and How
Psychology Can Inform the Law, 70 IND. L.J. 1241 (1995).
2. Joseph L. Hoffman, Where's the Buck?-JurorMisperception ofSentencingResponsibil-
ity in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1138 (1995).
3. IL at 1156.
4. Ia
5. In Indiana, an advisory verdict of life in prison may be overridden by the trial
judge, who may change the sentence to death. In Virginia, the trial judge may only upset a
[Vol. 11:2
COMMUNICATING WITH CAPITAL JURIES
death were not final, as a means of coping with their sense of responsibility.'
Notably, many of these jurors were aware of the fact that the trial judge was
very likely to follow the jury's instructions, yet nevertheless used the
"recommendation" language as a means of avoidance. 7 In sum, Hoffman's
work has empirically established that it is safe to make the assumption that
death penalty jurors will take advantage of any way possible in which to
minimize the extent of their personal responsibility for the sentencing
decision
2. The Mecbanisrns ofMoral Disengagement
Craig Haney has described five ways in which jurors minimize their
degree of personal responsibility drawing upon his own research and the
research of others, including those involved in the Capital Jury Project.
Haney argues that without employing five different methods of moral
disengagement, capital jurors would be unable to overcome their innate
moral trepidation at taking the life of another citizen.9 In Haney's opinion,
these five methods allow capital jurors to psychologically distance them-
selves from the moral implications of their actions.'" As a result, this
distancing allows the continued existence of capital punishment in this
country.I
a. Dehumanization
The first mechanism of moral disengagement is the dehumanization of
the defendant. 2 By viewing the defendant as an "other," a person with
whom the jurors have nothing in common and could not imagine interact-
ag with, even to the point of questioning the very humanity of the defen-
dant, jurors are more easily able to justify the killing of another. 3
jury sentence of death, and impose life in prison "upon good cause shown." See VA. CODE
ANN. S 19.2-264.5 (Michie 1998).
6. Hoffman, supra note 2, at 1156.
7. 1l
8. L at 1157.
9. Craig Haney, Violenceand the Capitaljury: Mechanisms ofMoralDisengagement and
the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1997).
10. Id at 1448. Haney also notes that since these mechanisms of moral disengagement
are in direct opposition to caring and compassion, they undermine the effect of mitigating
testimony in capital penalty trials, thus making a death verdict more likely. Id at 1450.
11. Id. at 1450.
12. Id. at 1451.
13. Haney notes that the modern execution ritual itself illustrates how extensive
bureaucratic procedures are used to ensure that the death row prisoner is completely dehu-
manized. Id at 1453. He also shows how other forms of state sanctioned killing have relied
upon this documented psychological mechanism with the most obvious examples being war
1999]
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It has been well documented that juries tend to extend mercy to those
defendants with whom they feel some kinship. 14 Haney argues that the very
structure of the current bifurcated death penalty trial itself exacerbates the
difficulty encountered by many jurors in relating to the defendant on a
human level, because defense attorneys are limited in presenting their case
in mitigation until the penalty phase. This phase, at the very tail end of the
trial, has been shown to have the lowest degree of effectiveness." Up until
the penalty phase, traditional guilt phase evidence depicts defendants only
as violent monsters. It is not revealed that they are the victims of abuse and
mental illness, conditions that have often played a pivotal role in causing a
defendant's criminal behavior.6
Tipping the scales even further, prosecutorial strategy typically involves
characterizing the defendant only on the basis of "isolated, albeit tragic and
horrible, moments of aggression." In the absence of counter-balancing
mitigation testimony by the defense, this allows the jury to effectively
dehumanize the defendant even further and feel little trepidation at retaliat-
ing against him with their own violent act."
Yet another factor to be considered is the often limited resources of the
defendant compared to those available to the prosecution. 8 Given that an
effective case in mitigation is usually a lengthy and time consuming process
that costs both time and money, this inequity makes it even more likely that
the jury will never hear enough of the defendant's mitigating circumstances
to make a truly informed life or death choice.
b. Viewing the Defendant as Deviant, Different, and Deficient
and the mistreatment of American slaves. Id Haney cites a quote by Albert Bandura that
sums this phenomenon up well: "People seldom condemn punitive conduct - in fact, they
create justifications for it - when they are directing their aggression at persons who have been
divested of their humanness." Id at 1451.
14. Id
15. Id. at 1455. Other Capital Jury Project research has established that the penalty
trial is the least well-remembered part of a capital trial. See William J. Bowers, The Capital
Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1086-87 &
tbl.2 (1995). See also infra Part II.D on premature decision-making, indicating that leaving
mitigation until the sentencing phase is made even more problematic when one considers
studies that have shown that many jurors make their sentencing decisions well before the
sentencing phase even begins.
16. See Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder Social Histories and the Logic
of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 559-74 (1995).
17. Haney, supra note 9, at 1456. A final way in which the legal process itself helps
jurors dehumanize the defendant is through the extensive use of legal language and the sterile
courtroom setting which both serve to detach the defendant even further from his back-
ground and circumstances in the minds of the jurors. IaM at 1454-55.
18. Id at 1458.
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The second mechanism of moral disengagement is that of viewing the
defendant as deviant, different, and deficient, a mechanism that is related to,
but distinct from, the dehumanization discussed above. This mechanism is
based upon the premise that "[h]uman beings react punitively toward
persons whom they regard as defective, foreign, deviant, or fundamentally
different from themselves." 9 This premise has been played out in numerous
arenas, the most notable being the exaggeration of distinguishing physical
characteristics of foreign enemies in wartime.2" In the death penalty context,
the more different and deviant the jury perceives the defendant to be, e.g.,
unlike themselves, the more likely the jury is to ignore the moral complexi-
ties of the life and death decision and characterize the defendant as purely
evil, criminal and deserving of death.2'
Racism is the most troubling "otherness" problem in the death penalty
context, as well as in many others.22 The legacy of discriminatory death
sentencing in the United States illustrates the close connection between the
tendency to view those different from ourselves as "other" and the ability
to morally distance oneself from life and death decision making.23 Unfortu-
nately, most death qualified juries are unlikely to share the racial and social
characteristics of most capital defendants, thus increasing the probability of
distancing and a resulting amoral life or death judgment.24
With this problem, as well as with the dehumanization problem dis-
cussed above, the tendency of the jury to be unaware of the defendant's case
in mitigation until the penalty phase only widens the gulf between the
juror's experiences and the defendant's.2" In sum, the way in which capital
trials are structured,26 and capital jurisprudence's failure to permit attorneys
19. Id at 1460.
20. Id at 1461.
21. Id Haney cites two studies that illustrate how this mechanism has functioned in
the criminal justice system. The first, conducted by Martha Duncan, argued that the ways
in which a prosecutor refers to the defendant using "metaphors of filth," such as "dirt,"
"slime," or "scum;" cognitively reinforced the separation of the "criminals" from the "non-
criminals." By placing the defendant in the "criminal" category, a category distinct from that
in which jurors place themselves, the jurors are able to morally disengage themselves from
the punitive process. Id at 1462. The second study, conducted by Louis Masur, analyzed the
death penalty in this country during the period between the Revolutionary and Civil Wars.
Masur found that foreign-born convicts accounted for a significant percentage of the people
executed during this period and explained that juries found it easier to convict outsiders of
capital crimes than to convict someone with ties to their community. Id
22. Id at 1463.
23. Id
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1464.
26. The structural characteristics include a bifurcated trial system, prosecutorial
strategies focussing upon only isolated horrible incidents, and limited resources and experi-
ence of many defense attorneys, to name only a few.
1999]
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to inform jurors about these types of issues, often encourage jurors to focus
upon difference and label it "bad" and apart from themselves. This law and
structure can keep them from recognizing the human commonality between
themselves and the defendant and the feelings of empathy and understanding
that such recognition allows."
c. Capital Violence as Self-Defense
The third mechanism discussed by which moral disengagement occurs
is based upon juror's natural fear of the defendant's potential to commit
future violence. Many proponents of the death penalty justify its imposi-
tion with the rationale that it protects innocent people and their communi-
ties.
Prosecutors often emphasize the heinousness of the crime to jurors,
thereby conjuring up punitive and vengeful feelings in hopes of convincing
them that death is the only reasonable punishment." While it is of course
reasonable for the prosecution to inform the jury of what are often despica-
ble acts on the part of capital defendants, these graphic depictions often
overshadow all else and lead jurors to behave irrationally out of fear when
asked to decide between a death sentence and a sentence to life in prison
without parole. 29 In fact, studies have indicated that jurors carefully con-
sider the issue of future dangerousness even when it is not explicitly raised
during trial." Studies have also shown that capital jurors discussed the
future dangerousness of the defendant more than any other factor presented
and seventy-five percent of jurors concluded that the evidence proved that
the defendant would be a future danger. 1
The disturbing facts usually involved in death penalty cases only
enhance the separation of experience between the defendant and the jurors.
This distancing only further promotes anger and fear of the defendant on
the part of the jury, feelings that are the essence of self-defense. In the face
of persuasive prosecution argument, many jurors decide that the only way
to protect their community from the defendant's violence is to sentence him
to death.
With the increased trend toward only life without parole as the alterna-
tive sentencing option, one would think that concerns about a defendant's
27. Haney, supra note 9, at 1467.
28. Id at 1468.
29. Id at 1468. In fact, studies have shown a very low level of violence among both life
and death sentenced prisoners, as well as among inmates who were released from prison. See
G. I. Giardini & R.G. Farrow, The Paroling of Capital Offenders, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
169, 177-84 (Thorsten Sellin ed. 1967) (providing an in depth statistical analysis of recidivism
rates of capital offenders).
30. Haney, supra note 9, at 1467.
31. Id
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future danger would be minimized.32 This is not necessarily the case. Many
jurors do not believe that life without parole actually means that the defen-
dant will never be released from prison." Even more disturbingly, death
qualified jurors34 are more likely to hold this mistaken belief than other
jurors, thus raising the possibility that a defendant sentenced to die may
have otherwise received a life sentence were this misunderstanding reme-
died."
d. Minimizing the Reality of Execution
One of the primary factors involved in making the life or death sen-
tencing decision is a contemplation of the actual punishment itself-the
execution. A variety of studies have indicated that capital jurors have a
skewed vision of what execution actually entails and what it is they are
being asked to do to the defendant.36 This distortion, or lack of understand-
ing, sheds some light on why so many capital jurors vote for death, and
comports with well established psychological principles. Failure or uncon-
scious refusal to directly confront the realities of death by execution is,
32. Most death penalty states, including Virginia, now provide for a life in prison
without parole sentencing option. See William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death By
Default: An Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77
TEX. L. REV. 605 (1999).
33. See Craig Haney et al., "Modern" Death Qualification: New Data on Its Biasing
Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 626 tbl.2 (1994).
In states that do not provide for a life in prison without parole option, it has been
found that jurors are so concerned over incapacitating the defendant that they will vote for
a sentence of death even if they don't believe it is warranted in order to safeguard the
community. These jurors believed that a life sentence did not really mean the defendant
would be incarcerated for life, but would instead be released on parole relatively soon. There
was also evidence in this study that many jurors mistakenly did not view the handing down
of a death sentence as necessarily meaning that the defendant would be put to death. Instead,
they noted that he would have his opportunity to appeal and the state would likely never get
around to executing him. See Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in
Capital Trials: The View from the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103, 1131 (1995).
For a recent and thorough discussion of the widespread and alarming tendency of jurors
to misunderstand death penalty alternatives and the absence of appropriate punishment
options, namely life in prison without parole, in some states see Bowers & Steiner, supra note
32.
34. "Death qualification" means that the juror's views on the death penalty will not
prevent or substantially impair her ability to follow the law and impose either a sentence of
life in prison or death. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 810 (1985); Morgan v. Illinois, 504
U.S. 719 (1992).
35. Haney et al., supra note 33, at 626, tbl.2.
36. See Joan W. Howarth, Deciding to Kill: Revealing the Gender in the Task Handed
to CapitalJurors, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1345, 1387-88 (1994).
1999] 269
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therefore, yet another means through which jurors distance themselves from
the daunting task before them.37
Classic psychological studies have proven that people who are forced
to involve themselves and feel responsible for the well being of others are
more likely to behave in a socially responsible, rather than blindly obedient,
manner." Conversely, people are more likely to punish when the conse-
quences of their decision is minimized and obscured, and the person receiv-
ing the punishment is not known or understood by them. 9
One important way in which jurors are sheltered from the dreadful
reality of the task before them is by the courts' continued exclusion of
evidence about what actually occurs during an execution." This lack of
exposure to the violence of execution is in direct contrast to the extensive
showings by the prosecution of weapons and wounds and victim impact
evidence, evidence that is usually presented to jurors in terrifying detail and
testified about by many witnesses.41 The result is a trial where jurors are
exposed only to the violence wreaked by the defendant, while the violence
being advocated by the state as a necessary punishment for the defendant's
crime is cloaked in innuendo and ambiguity.
This lopsided presentation is unfair for it denies the jurors the full facts,
facts they need to make a just sentencing decision.42 This unfairness is
intensified by the previously cited evidence showing that many capital
jurors are misinformed about the meaning of a sentence of life in prison
without parole, and are skeptical that a death sentence will actually result in
the death of the defendant.43
e. The Scapegoat ofAuthorization
People are also more likely to punish another if they feel that they have
been ordered to do so." In the words of one commentator: "[S]ocial
scientists have long known that violence is facilitated when those in power
define certain situations as ones in which standard moral principles do not
37. See Haney, supra note 9, at 1474-75.
38. See Harney A. Tilker, Socially Responsible Behavior as a Function of Observer
Responsibility and Victim Feedback, 14 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 95, 99-100 (1970);
see also STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974).
39. Id
40. Howarth, supra note 36, at 1391.
41. See Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: On Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 19, 52 (1993).
42. See Haney, supra note 9, at 1477-78.
43. Id at 1477-79.
44. Id. at 1481.
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apply and then 'authorize' people to act outside the boundaries of normative
moral codes."4"
The capital trial process has been analyzed as tending to make it seem
that the "law" prefers a verdict of death over that of life.' As a result of
this, in combination with the psychological tendency described above, more
people are sentenced to death. 47 A variety of procedures have been noted as
implying to jurors that a verdict of death is required if the law is to be
followed.
The two most important ones are death-qualifying voir dire and jury
instructions given immediately before sentencing. Death-qualifying voir
dire has been shown to convince some jurors that by sitting on the jury they
are promising the judge that they will impose the death penalty.48 Also,
depending upon how death-qualifying questions are couched, some jurors
have incorrectly interpreted the instruction to "follow the law" as implying
that the law requires a death verdict.4
Jury sentencing instructions present another problem. Convoluted
legalistic language in these instructions often end up presenting the jury with
the apparent choice of rendering a "moral," extra-legal decision (likely to be
death, given the jurors death-qualification), or applying a legal formula that
they do not comprehend." Often, as a result of this confusion, the defen-
dant is given a sentence of death by default, because the jury did not under-
stand how to apply legal standards that, if properly applied, may have
clearly indicated that a life sentence was more appropriate."
Given the difficult moral choice set before capital jurors and the psy-
chological mechanism that allows one to kill more easily if authorized to do
so, it is not surprising that most find it easier to make a decision if they can
justify it as being mandated by the "law" or the "judge." In fact, studies
conducted within the Capital Jury Project found that eight out of ten jurors
interviewed felt that the defendant or the law is the most responsible for the
defendant's punishment, while only 6.4% of jurors felt that the individual
45. Id. See also Herbert C. Hampton & V. Lee Hamilton, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE:
TOWARDS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 16-17 (1989).
46. SeeWilliamS. Geimer, LawandReality in the CapitalPenaly Trial, 18 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 273, 277-78 (1990).
47. See Haney, supra note 9, at 1482.
48. Id
49. Id Haney also opines that the personal characteristics of death-qualified jurors
render them particularly susceptible to arguments that they must follow a "promise" made
to the court. Idt
50. See WELSH S. WHITE, THEDEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION
OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 69 (1987).
51. Haney, supra note 9, at 1483. Confusion often centers around the proper roles of




juror was most responsible. 2 - This dovetails with the primary thesis ex-
plored by Hoffman, positing that jurors will opt to shed themselves of
responsibility for the capital sentencing decision if at all possible.
B. The Role of Remorse in Determining a Sentence of Life or Death
Another factor that has received scholarly attention is the effect that
the jury's perception of a defendant's remorse, or lack of it, has upon
determining whether or not he will receive a death sentence. Scott Sundby
is one such researcher whose conclusions are extremely informative. The
following is a synopsis of Sundby's findings as a result of data he gathered
from the California segment of the Capital Jury Project. 3
1. Remorse is Important
Our society expects those members who commit egregious wrongs to
seek forgiveness for their sins.' In the case of the taking of another human
life, the wrongdoer is often deemed to have forfeited his right to continue
to live free in society and is also expected to suffer from deep remorse for
the life they have brutally cut short.5" This being the case, it makes sense
that capital jurors seek out signs of remorse from capital defendants.5 6 It
follows also that when remorse is not found, these jurors are much more
likely to sentence that defendant to death." Both the study conducted by
Sundby, and those that came before, make it clear that a defendant's lack of
remorse plays a significant role in convincing jurors to vote for death. 8
Sundby's article and study, however, also shed light upon how jurors
conclude whether or not a defendant is remorseful, how different trial
strategies affect jurors' perceptions, and how these perceptions influence the
life or death sentencing decision. 9 One of the most important of Sundby's
findings on a practical level is the discovery that it is how the defense pres-
52. WilliamJ. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview ofEarly
Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1094 (1995).
53. See Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial
Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557 (1998). To compile his
data, Sundby conducted extensive interviews with the jury panels of thirty-seven capital
sentencing proceedings in California. IL at 1559.




58. Id. Seealso Mark Constanzo & Sally Constanzo,JuryDecision Making in the Capital
Penalty Phase, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 198 (1992); William S. Geimer & Jonathan
Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty
Cases, 15 AM.J. CRIM. L. 1, 51-52 (1987-88).
59. Sundby, supra note 53, at 1558.
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ents its case that has the most influence upon whether jurors will hold lack
of remorse against a defendant.' It is critical for criminal defense lawyers
to understand how to present their case to a capital jury in a way that won't
allow the jury to play their "lack of remorse card," for it is this factor that
may make the difference between a death sentence and one of life in prison
without parole.
First, it is notable that most defendants in the study did not testify.6
Therefore, the jurors' perception of the defendant's remorse, or lack of it,
was not based upon the defendant's words. Instead, jurors based their
remorse-related perceptions upon the nature of the defendant's actions at the
time of the crime, such as what the defendant said before and after the
killing, and also upon improper acts committed by the defendant while in
custody, such as the making of a weapon or an attempt to escape.62 How-
ever, by far the most influential factor that helped to form juror's percep-
tions of a defendant's remorse was his demeanor and behavior during the
trial itself.63
The most often commented upon indicator of a lack of remorse was the
defendant's seeming lack of emotion.' Other related indicators were an air
of nonchalance and the appearance of being bored.65 Jurors commented that
without any sign of emotion on the part of the defendant they found it very
difficult to view him as a human being, given the horrendous crimes of
which he was accused." This inability to humanize the defendant is worri-
some for it facilitates the moral disengagement mechanism discussed
earlier.67
Sundby found that only a very small percentage of the jury panels
analyzed perceived the defendant as remorseful but a far greater percentage
handed down a life sentence." The fact that jurors who find the defendant
unremorseful can still sentence him to life indicates that an absence of
remorse does not necessarily mean the defendant will be sentenced to
death.69 As explanation, Sundby concluded that remorse should not be
viewed narrowly as meaning only that the defendant felt sorry for his
60. Id at 1558-59.
61. Id at 1560.
62. Id. at 1560-61.
63. Id at 1561-62.
64. Id at 1563. A much smaller number of jurors pointed to the defendant's displays
of anger and inappropriate behavior at trial as indicators of a lack of remorse, while an even
smaller number stated that the defendant's physical appearance was an indicator of a lack of
remorse. In most cases, however, the defendant did not misbehave or appear "criminal." Id.
65. Id at 1564.
66. Id
67. See supra Part ll.A.2.




actions, but should instead be expanded to include whether or not he was
willing to accept some responsibility for the crime he committed."0 Looking
at remorse in this way, Sundby found that the more responsibility the
defendant took upon himself for the crime, the greater the chance that the
jury viewed him as remorseful.
2. The Relevance of "Denial"and "Admission" Defenses
Concluding that defendant's acceptance of responsibility influences the
jury's decision making, Sundby then noted that whether or not the defen-
dant utilized a "denial" or an "admission," defense played a pivotal role in
determining whether the jurors would view him as remorseful and, there-
fore, less deserving of a death sentence.
A "denial" defense was one in which the defendants maintained their
innocence and denied all involvement in the killing," while an "admission"
defense was one in which the defendants contested an element of the crime
(e.g., premeditation) or the existence of a special circumstance (e.g., the
killing occurred during a robbery), but did not deny participation in the
crime. 3
In those cases where the defendant employed a "denial" defense, the
jury was twice as likely to impose a death sentence, while the juries in
"admission" defense cases chose a verdict of life over death in a ratio of three
to two." Sundby's research also showed that the negative impact of a
"denial" defense was exacerbated by the defendant taking the stand on his
own behalf and denying his involvement in the crime, for it indicated an
even greater degree of denial of responsibility."
As one would expect, the situation was entirely different when a
defendant used an "admission" defense. When such a defendant verbally
acknowledged his participation in the killing, the likelihood of his receiving
a life sentence significantly increased.76
3. The Importance of When Remorse is Expressed
Sundby also analyzed cases in terms of whether the defendants ex-
pressed remorse at the penalty phase. These included both "denial" and
70. Id at 1573.
71. Id at 1584.
72. Id at 1574.
73. Id at 1584.
74. Id at 1574-75.
75. Id at 1575.
76. Id at 1584. Sundby also analyzed cases in which the defendant confessed to the
crime. In those cases in which the defendant voluntarily turned himself in to the authorities
all five defendants received life sentences. Id
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"admission" defense cases. The resulting data clearly indicated that the
earlier defendants express remorse the better, for if such statements do not
come until the penalty phase juries are likely to be very skeptical of their
sincerity and are unlikely to grant mercy."
Apparently, in order for remorseful testimony at the penalty phase to
be effective, the defense must somehow incororate evidence of some
acceptance of responsibility into the guilt phase." Only then does the later
testimony appear genuine7 This tendency causes the defendant's case in
mitigation to run a great chance of being rendered ineffective.8" For exam-
ple, facts from the defendant's history such as drug or child abuse will only
seem like yet another example of the defendant denying responsibility for
his crime. Instead, the data indicated that the defendant's case in mitiga-
tion, if concentrated in the penalty phase, is much more effective if the
defendant has previously accepted a certain amount of responsibility for his
actions.82 As discussed above, one way to show an acceptance of responsibil-
ity is for the defendant to pursue an "admission," rather than a "denial"
defense strategy, thereby increasing the chance that jurors will take penalty
phase mitigation testimony seriously.83 An "admission" defense strategy also
has the added benefit of providing opportunities to weave mitigation testi-
mony into the guilt phase, testimony which can then be harmonized with
later penalty phase testimony.
8 4
C. How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony
In addition to his work involving the role of remorse, Scott Sundby
also analyzed how capital jurors perceive, use, and compare expert and lay
testimony.8 The results of his research shed important light upon the
relative persuasiveness of different types of witness testimony. Sundby's
findings may contradict the assumptions of many defense attorneys about
77. Id at 1586. As one would guess, the jurors viewed such statements as last ditch
efforts to play upon their sympathy. Id Some jurors even expressed annoyance that the
defendant had acknowledged his guilt only after being convicted. They felt that the defen-
dant had thereby subjected them to an agonizing guilt/innocence decision unnecessarily. Id.
at 1587.
78. Id at 1587-88.
79. Id
80. Id at 1588.
81. Id at 1590.
82. Id at 1593.
83. Id. at 1594.
84. Id at 1595-96.
85. See Scott E. Sundby, The Ju-y As Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1997).
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how experts are perceived and the most effective way of presenting mitigat-
ing evidence.86
1. The Messenger is as Important as the Message
Sundby's research clearly indicates that the jury will have biases for and
against different types of witnesses which will contribute to the effectiveness
of certain testimony. The three types of witnesses analyzed were profes-
sional experts, lay experts, and "family and friends" witnesses.87
a. Professional Experts
These are defined as those experts who possess training or education
beyond the knowledge of the average juror.8 Most charge a fee for their
testimony and have no previous connection to the defendant.89 These types
of experts are used often for a number of reasons. First, they are available,
for courts will often supply such experts under the aegis of Ake v.
Oklahoma' to safeguard the defendant's due process rights.91  Second,
because the process for obtaining such experts is apparent and relatively
straightforward, many attorneys with little capital defense experience
understandably view retaining such an expert as a way to feel more in
control of the complex capital litigation process.92
Despite the popularity of expert witnesses, the data strongly indicated
that these were the defense witnesses viewed most negatively by jurors.93
They were well remembered by jurors, even though often for not being
86. This project was also funded by the Capital Jury Project. The data for this study
came from interviews with 152 California jurors sitting on thirty-six capital cases. Id. at 1112-
13. Sundby notes that the reactions of the capital jurors interviewed may not completely
mirror all potential jurors, for all of those interviewed were death-qualified. Therefore, a
random cross-section of the community was not represented, for those people who could not
under any circumstances impose and death sentence and those who would always impose a
death sentence for first degree murder were excluded. Ma at 1114.
87. Id at 1118.
88. d at 1121. The most commonly used expert in the capital context is a psychiatrist
or psychologist. Id at 1118.
89. Id.
90. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Note, however, that a particularized showing of need is
required. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
91. Sundby, supra note 85, at 1120-21.
92. Id at 1121-22.
93. Professional experts accounted for two-thirds of all juror references to defense
witnesses as "backfiring" or being difficult to believe, but for only one-fifth of positive
references. Id. at 1122-23. Jurors negatively cited twenty-seven different defense experts in
eighteen cases at either the guilt or penalty stages of the trial, while only nine defense experts
in a total of eight cases were cited as positive influences. Id at 1123.
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believable.94 Also, interestingly, professional experts for the defense received
a much more hostile reception than those testifying for the prosecution.
This was attributed to the fact that prosecution experts are used principally
to rebut theories proffered by the defendant, not advance their own, as well
as the fact that they are not perceived as being paid for their testimony as is
the case with defense witnesses.' The data, however, was not entirely
discouraging. When the professional experts were received positively their
testimony was shown to heighten the chances of the defendant receiving a
life sentence.97
There were three primary reasons cited for the jurors' mistrust of
professional expert testimony. The first was that they were very likely to
be perceived as "hired guns" for they were thought to tailor their opinions
for the benefit of whomever was paying them.98 This perception of expert
witnesses as "hired guns" effects defense witnesses far more often than
witnesses for the prosecution. Since prosecution experts are not specifically
paid for their work on the case, they are not perceived as having as much to
gain from tailoring their testimony as are witnesses for the defense.99
Defense counsel apparently are not communicating to jurors that these
witnesses have a greater potential for bias because their entire income
depends on government employment, as compared with the receipt of a
one-time fee.
The second reason for juror mistrust of professional expert testimony
was the tendency of the jurors to be hypercritical and skeptical of the
expert's theories, qualifications, and preparedness. This readiness to dis-
count an expert's testimony was closely related to the distrust engendered
by the "hired gun" perception discussed above."° In addition, many jurors
simply had a generalized suspicion of experts, for they were thought to be
"not in touch with reality," often cloistered in their "ivory towers" with
little understanding of the real life application of their theories." 1 Many
jurors also expressed the impression that the expert was attempting to
manipulate them with their testimony by casting doubt where there was
none. 2 Finally, when many jurors compared their own life experiences
and known theories of human behavior they would rarely comport with the
94. Id at 1123-24.
95. Id at 1125.
96. Id
97. Id at 1124-25.
98. The fact that the expert is paid for his or her services always comes out, for it is
textbook strategy for cross-examining expert witnesses to ask them about their fees. Id.
99. Id at 1128-29.
100. Id at 1130.
101. Id at 1132.
102. Id at 1134.
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theory advanced by the defense's professional expert.l"3 The defendant's
behavior was, naturally, not considered "normal" by jurors, and when the
defense expert attempted to explain the reasons for the "abnormal" behav-
ior, many jurors would discount such testimony as flying in the face of their
concept of personal responsibility."° A remarkable number of jurors had
shared certain experiences with the defendant, such as an impoverished
childhood or drug addiction, and would often note that, unlike the defen-
dant, while these were true hardships, they had survived them without
committing murder."15 In sum, many defense experts' mitigation oriented
theories run in direct opposition to jurors' notions of free will, making most
jurors extremely skeptical of the experts' testimony.
A final insight into jurors' perceptions of professional experts was the
danger that their testimony would be ignored or even deemed harmful if it
were not shown how this testimony blended with the general theory of the
case."°6 For example, an expert's testimony was construed as communicating
the opposite of what the defense intended in the case of a psychiatrist who,
by describing the defendant's mental illnesi noted that without medication
he would become violent.'17 What was intended as evidence lessening the
defendant's culpability instead created a fear that unless the defendant were
subjected to capital punishment he would kill again."0 '
b. Lay Experts
In contrast, jurors reacted very favorably to lay experts: experts who
had knowledge of the defendant, or the defendant's experiences, through
their own experiences and who had insights based upon that knowledge.
103. Id. at 1136-37.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1137-38. On this important issue, it is important to attempt to communicate
two points. First, the law is not asking jurors to make a choice between those like themselves
who overcome obstacles like abuse, poverty, and neglect without killing and those with
similar obstacles who killed. Instead they are being asked to choose which murderers should
spend the rest of their lives in prison and which should be executed. Since that is the choice,
should not the obstacles (e.g., abuse and neglect) weigh in the defendant's favor? Further,
should it not be possible to recognize and celebrate those who faced adversity but did not
turn to violence without having to kill those who, like the defendant, also struggled against
them but failed?
106. Id. at 1142-43.
107. Id. at 1144.
108. IM.
109. Id. at 1118. Statistically speaking, lay experts received the most favorable positive
to negative impression ratio in the study. Jurors named them as among the most influential
witnesses fifteen times, while they were only reported as backfiring on three occasions. IM.
at 1124.
An example of a lay witness with knowledge based upon interaction with the defendant
is that of a prison guard in a facility where the defendant was incarcerated, while an example
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The lay witness was not perceived as having a personal bias for, or necessar-
ily any direct knowledge of, the defendant. An added benefit is that the
witness usually testifies free of charge."' The lay witness's testimony is not
derived from professional training or education, as with professional experts,
but directly from his or her experiences."' This favorable reaction is not
surprising for lay experts have the opposite attributes of professional ex-
perts, who engendered such negative reactions.
Within the group of lay witnesses, the most effective were those who
would not have been thought to be supportive of the defendant, such as the
testimony of a prison guard or a nurse." Another benefit of lay witnesses
who testify based upon their common experiences with the defendant was
that they provided context to the professional expert's testimony concern-
ing such things as a childhood riddled with abuse or neglect.' Yet another
benefit is that it is virtually impossible for the prosecution to undermine
their testimony through cross-examination. Again, however, even though
lay witnesses are favorably received, it is important that their testimony be
consistent with the general theme of mitigation."4
c. "Family and Friends" Witnesses
These witnesses, while not quite as overwhelmingly effective as lay
witnesses, were named as positive influences a great majority of the time."'
While inherently biased in favor of the defendant, a defendant's family and
friends frequently testify during the penalty phase of the trial to appeal for
mercy on the defendant's behalf. '16 This testimo'ny was generally well
received and expected, despite its inherent bias. 7 In fact, it was the absence
of such testimony that worked against the defendant, for jurors deemed the
absence of such character witnesses to indicate true depravity, on the theory
that if even his family would not say something positive on his behalf, he
must be beyond redemption.'
of a lay witness with knowledge based upon a common experience would be a victim of
incest, who, while not acquainted with the defendant, can explain how such an experience
affected them. id. at 1118.
110. kId
111. Id
112. Id at 1147.
113. Id at 1146.
114. Id at 1150.
115. Id. at 1124. These witnesses were named as positive influences for the defense
thirty-nine times and were viewed as backfiring only fifteen times. These numbers are almost
the mirror opposite of those received by professional experts. Id.
116. Id at 1119.
117. Id at 1151-52.
118. id at 1152. The worst possible scenario, however, is when the defendant's family
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The effectiveness of this sort of testimony relates to its ability to show
that someone cares about the defendant as a son or a brother, thus humaniz-
ing the defendant and showing that he is more than just a cold-blooded
killer. This view of the good within the defendant is very important mitiga-
tion at the penalty trial. The jury has usually just experienced a trial filled
with images of the horrible things the defendant has done, images which are
resonating in their minds at the start of the penalty trial.
While some jurors contended that they were not affected by this kind
of testimony, it is probably impossible for a juror to discount it altogether,
even if only subconsciously.'19 In addition, family testimony may be invalu-
able if part of the defendant's case in mitigation revolves around such things
as child abuse. 20 The testimony by a sibling of the defendant, for example,
is an extremely effective way of entering the narrative of the abuse suffered
by the defendant into evidence.' Another benefit to these witnesses, as
with lay expert witnesses, is the difficulty of the prosecution in cross-exam-
ining such a witness on such topics as their love for the defendant, or their
descriptions of the child abuse suffered by the defendant and the witness,
thus making these witnesses relatively risk-free.'
d. The Importance of a Coherent Theme
One of the most important lessons to be learned from Sundby's data
is that the most successful defense cases used a combination of different
types of testimony to create a coherent, harmonious theme that spanned
both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial.' Using lay experts whenever
possible; "family and friend" witnesses for emotional input and to flesh out
the case in mitigation; and professional experts to complement, but not
overshadow, the testimony of the two other groups, provides the greatest
chance of securing the client a sentence of life.'24
D. Premature Decision Making: The Foreclosure of Impartiality in
Capital Sentencing
and friends testified against the defendant. Id at 1160-61.
119. Id at 1155-56.
120. Id at 1156-57.
121. Id It is also important to present this sort of testimony in sufficient detail to show
a full factual picture of the defendant, for without such a picture, jurors may view such
testimony as an attempt to emotionally manipulate them. Id at 1160-61.
122. Id at 1159-60. As mentioned above, this is provided so that the witness will relate
impressions and experiences that will not work against the defendant. Id at 1161. See supra
note 113 and accompanying text.
123. Id at 1163.
124. Id. at 1164.
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The bifurcation of a capital trial is intended to allow sentencing to be
free of constitutionally impermissible arbitrariness and discrimination and
to prevent jurors from allowing the guilt decision to be influenced by
punishment considerations.125 This is thought to be achieved by applying
special rules of evidence to the sentencing phase which allow the relatively
flexible articulation of both aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as a
different set of instructions from the judge, in order that jurors can make a
fair decision untainted by the emotion engendered by the guilt phase.'26
A recent study conducted by William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys and
Benjamin D. Steiner indicates, however, that nearly half of capital jurors
decide upon the appropriate punishment before the sentencing phase even
begins.' This means that these jurors are relatively impervious to the
specially tailored evidence and arguments concerning sentencing, and to the
judge's sentencing instructions. These findings call into question both the
efficacy and fundamental fairness of the bifurcated system as it now oper-
ates. 2 ' The researchers convincingly demonstrate that those jurors who
decide punishment so prematurely violate the defendant's right to an impar-
tial jury, for these jurors are not capable of making a reasoned moral choice
between a sentence of life or death, if their minds are closed to the entire
sentencing phase of the trial.'29 While it is established that the ability to
keep an "open mind" and to resist the tendency to reach conclusions prema-
turely are the hallmarks of being a good juror, this data indicates that a
sizable percentage of jurors chosen to sit on capital cases are unable to live
up to these ideals. 30
Even more threatening to the hope of a fair trial is that a majority of
those who stated that they had decided the sentence during the guilt phase,
were "absolutely convinced" of their positions. 3' This data suggests that a
juror's early decision concerning punishment will dominate their subse-
quent thinking about punishment and also indicates a likelihood that these
jurors will hold fast to their early positions through the end of the sentenc-
125. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (approving capital statutes with a
bifurcated scheme).
126. See William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors'
Predispositions, Guilt- Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1476, 1479 n.7 (1998).
127. These researchers, also a part of the Capital Jury Project, interviewed 916 capital
jurors in eleven states to reach their conclusions. Id. at 1477. Almost half of the jurors
interviewed (48.3%) stated that they knew what the punishment should be during the guilt
phase of the trial. Id. at 1488.
128. Id. at 1477.
129. Id. at 1485.
130. Id. at 1489.
131. Id. Seven out of ten jurors who took a pro-death stand felt this way and six out of
ten pro-life jurors adopted the same view. Id.
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ing phase."' Subsequent data did indeed lend support to both of these
suggestions.13 In contrast, with those jurors who were undecided as to
punishment at the guilt phase, it was impossible to predict how they would
eventually decide, indicating that the evidence presented at the sentencing
phase was given at least some effect.'34
Many jurors who made their punishment decision prematurely made
their decision at the time evidence was presented at the guilt phase. 3 ' In
addition, this was a more common occurrence among pro-death jurors than
among those that prematurely decided for a life sentence.136 Also, for those
jurors who made their simultaneous decisions during jury deliberations at
the guilt phase, the pro-life jurors significantly outweighed the pro-death
jurors in number.'37 Interestingly, in contrast, almost three-quarters of those
jurors who were undecided on punishment at the guilt stage stated that they
made their determinations as to guilt and punishment on different
grounds. 3 '
Other especially relevant findings were that an early stand for a death
sentence often seemed to arise from the perception that the defendant was
"unrepentant" and likely to be a danger in the future.'39 For those jurors
who voted for life, however, it was often questions about the defendant's
responsibility for the crime or his background that tipped the scales toward
a verdict of life."4 Also interesting was the finding that many early pro-
death jurors operated under the presumption that strong proof of guilt
justified the death penalty, a finding that indicates a clear misunderstanding
of both law and procedure. 4'
132. Id. at 1490-91.
133. Id. at 1491-93. Six out of ten jurors who thought they knew what the correct
punishment was at the guilt phase of the trial held to their opinions for the rest of the trial.
Id at 1491.
134. Id at 1493.
135. Id at 1493-94. The data indicated that 48.5% of all jurors who took a stand on
punishment prior to the sentencing stage of the trial stated that the presentation of evidence
was the point at which they formed their opinion on punishment. Id at 1495. Also, more
pro-death jurors (54.6%) than pro-life jurors (39.0%) stated that this was when they made
their decision. Id
136. Id. at 1494.
137. Id. at 1495-96. 28.1% of pro-life jurors decided the defendant's fate during jury
deliberations at the guilt phase, as compared to only 10.1% of pro-death jurors. Id at 1495.
138. Id at 1494.
139. Id at 1502.
140. Id
141. Id at 1497. On the contrary, it is established that the death penalty should not be
the appropriate punishment for all murderers, but only for the most culpable of offenders.
The act t at a defendant is found guilty of murder does not automatically mean he should
receive death. There must be a means of distinguishing a case in which the death penalty is
warranted from one in which it is not. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Maynard
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Finally, the researchers asked jurors about the acceptability of the death
penalty for seven different types of murder in order to determine if the
jurors personal feelings about the death penalty mar impair their ability to
properly function as members of a capital jury." In order to function
properly, jurors must not regard the death penalty as an unacceptable option
given certain aggravating circumstances, nor can they re ard it as the only
acceptable punishment given mitigating circumstances.14
Disturbingly, over half of the jurors interviewed stated that they
thought that death was the only acceptable' punishment for three of the
murder types: repeat murder, premeditated murder, and multiple murder.'"
Half of the jurors stated that the only acceptable punishment was death for
the killing of a police officer, or for murder by a drug dealer, and almost a
quarter of the jurors interviewed thought death was the only appropriate
punishment for three of the remaining four crimes-including rape without
murder!4 Only for a planned attempted murder did fewer than one in four
jurors state that death was not the appropriate punishment. 46
Clearly, many of the jurors chosen for capital juries fail to appreciate
the principle set forth in Woodson v. North Carolina,4 ' that the death
penalty is never the only acceptable punishment for a capital offense. 4 The
researchers also proffer that this widespread predisposition toward a death
sentence may contribute to the common tendency to decide the defendant's
punishment prematurely.
149
IIL Altering Trial Strategies in Response to These Findings
The materials discussed above strongly suggest the need to reexamine
penalty trial approaches and tactics. New approaches must be found to
address the obstacles identified here, as well as to make more persuasive the
affirmative case against death. There is no recipe or formula for this, of
course. What follows are a few suggested approaches dealing with some, but
not all, of the issues identified in this article.
v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
142. Id at 1504.
143. Id. at 1504-07.
144. Id. at 1504.
145. Id
146. Id at 1505. Only 15.7% of jurors felt that death was the only appropriate punish-
ment in such a case. Id
147. 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); see also
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the death penalty is disproportionate
punishment for the rape of an adult woman where the victim is not killed).




A. Addressing the Responsibility Issue
1. Emphasize Personal Responsibility
Given that the data has shown that most jurors try to avoid personal
responsibility for their sentencing decisions if at all possible, the capital
defense attorney must make every effort to impress upon the jury their
personal responsibility for the taking of the defendant's life. Death penalty
jurors must be told in "strong, unequivocal language" that their role is both
a difficult one and one which they cannot in truth pass off onto the
"shoulders" of the judge, the defendant, or an abstract concept of "the
law."50 This message should be communicated at as many points during the
sentencing phase as possible. It should be mentioned in the opening state-
ment, in the closing argument, and in proposed sentencing instructions.'
It should also be emphasized that while the balancing of aggravating
and mitigating factors is intended to guide the jurors' discretion, the out-
come of this "balancing" is not intended to result in a mathematically based
sentencing "answer." This should, hopefully, prevent jurors from transfer-
ring responsibility for the defendant's fate from themselves to "the law." It
is also important to clarify for jurors the fact that being chosen to sit on a
capital jury does not mean that they in any way promise to impose the
death penalty should the defendant be found guilty. Instead, the Woodson
principle should be explained in clear, non-legalistic language, with the goal
of eliminating any potentially deadly confusion.
2. Counteracting the Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement
a. Dehumanization and Viewing the Defendant as "Other"
One of the most important ways to counteract the tendency of capital
jurors to view the defendant as less than human and, therefore, easily
deserving of death is to weave as much of the case in mitigation into the
guilt phase as possible. This will serve to show the defendant earlier in life
in a context other than that of "murderer." Using lay and "family and
friend" witnesses when at all possible is a good idea. This will, obviously,
be much easier to accomplish at the sentencing phase, but, if the case in
chief includes any facts that could be attested to by these types of witnesses
rather than professional experts, every effort should be made to choose the
former over the latter.
150. See Hoffman, supra note 2, at 1157-58.
151. Since Virginia does not subscribe to the procedure of the jury making only a
sentencing "recommendation" to the judge, this means of abdicating responsibility should not
be a problem. Nevertheless, it must be assumed that jurors are aware that there is an appeals
process in capital cases.
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It is always important to emphasize commonalities between the defen-
dant and the jurors so as to diffuse the psychological tendency of jurors to
distance themselves from those viewed as different from them. Bringing out
the fact that the defendant attended local schools and participated in local
sports is just one way of doing this. However, care must be taken not to
have this sort of information backfire by leading the jurors to be irrationally
fearful of his reentering their community or by causing an "I grew up in the
same way but didn't become a killer" reaction.
It is also helpful to emphasize the fact that most aggressive behaviors
are learned defensively as a result of abuse, rather than a completely irratio-
nal reaction resulting from an inherent defect in the defendant's psyche.
As with any trial, there are always countervailing considerations, such
as a hostile family, which may prevent the use of such witnesses and the
introduction of certain helpful humanizing evidence. Nevertheless, just
keeping in mind the importance of counteracting the prosecution's attempts
to characterize the defendant as only a killer will assist in presenting the
defendant in as sympathetic a light as possible.
Also, given that racism is the most common factor causing a jury to
consider the defendant only as "other," it is important to make every effort
possible to ensure that jurors of the defendant's race are included on the
panel. At the very least, an effort should be made to eliminate those jurors
with little or no experience with other races. A Batson challenge may be
appropriate in some instances and should be made whenever possible."'
Statistics on death penalty discrimination may also be brought to the jurors'
attention, at the voir dire stage, and beyond, if the judge will allow it.
b. "Life"Means "Life"and "Death" Means "Death"
Given that future dangerousness is the factor most discussed by capital
jurors, it is vital to explain to jurors that a sentence of life in prison without
parole means exactly that in Virginia. It is also vital to explain to jurors that
a sentence of death does in fact mean that the defendant will be executed.
This information should, whenever possible, be accompanied by evidence
that the defendant would be a model prisoner, and unlikely to kill again in
prison or effect an escape.
Another prudent strategy is to try to give the jurors a greater under-
standing of the reality of execution, for the research has indicated that most
jurors have a skewed vision of how executions are actually carried out. By
exposing the jurors to the reality of state-sanctioned killing in all its gory
details, the jurors may be more likely to feel responsible for the potential
killing of the defendant. Such evidence may also help to counterbalance the
152. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (permitting defendant to establish that
black jurors were excluded on the basis of race and that the system of peremptory challenges
was operated in a discriminatory fashion).
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violence of the prosecution's evidence concerning the nature of the defen-
dant's crime. This issue can be addressed both during voir dire and in
penalty trial evidence."5 3
B. Using the Remorse Issue to the Defendant's Advantage
The most important lesson to be learned from the information gath-
ered concerning the role of remorse is the importance of structuring the
guilt-innocence presentation so that it harmonizes, rather than contradicts,
the mitigation theme at the sentencing phase. The research has clearly
shown that pursuing a standard strategy of challenging the prosecution's
case for failing to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not likely to be
a winning strategy in most cases."5 4 Also, the hope of creating a lingering
doubt in the minds of the jury has been shown to be limited in its effect.' '
Instead, it is critical for the defense to portray the defendant as taking
responsibility for his actions, unless, of course, it is a case in which the
evidence against the defendant is weak. It is not advisable to pursue a
"denial" defense unless the evidence will clearly support such an approach.
Pursuing a "denial" defense in hopes of an acquittal, followed by evidence
of remorse in the sentencing phase, has been shown to be a likely recipe for
a death sentence. By pursuing an "admission" defense, on the other hand,
the defendant shows a certain amount of acceptance of responsibility for his
actions, even if his demeanor in the courtroom does not communicate
remorsefulness. The defense must be careful that the "admission" defense
be based upon a plausible theory of the case, however, so as not to under-
mine the defendant's basic acknowledgment of the killing and to be sure to
weave a common thread of mitigation into both the guilt and sentencing
phases of the trial.1
6
In sum, the defense attorney should consider carefully the dire ramifica-
tions of a "denial" defense if the defendant is found guilty. The attorney
should counsel the defendant as to the risk of pursuing such a course if the
prosecution's case is strong, as well as tell the defendant of the benefits of
pursuing an "admission" defense instead. If the client insists upon a "denial"
defense despite these admonitions, 5 7 the attorney should be wary of saving
153. Care should be taken, however, that this evidence is not perceived as an attack on
the death penalty itself. It is simply a way to impress upon the jurors the gravity of the
decision they are called upon to make.
154. See Sundby, supra note 53, at 1597-98.
155. Id at 1579, 97.
156. Id at 142.
157. As recent revelations of four hundred incidents of gross prosecutorial misconduct
discovered recently by the Chicago Tribune have illustrated, the "denial" defense is sometimes
the truth and being unjustly convicted of a crime one did not commit is a possibility if the
prosecution does not abide by their ethical responsibilities. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice
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all mitigating evidence until the sentencing phase of the trial for the data
indicates that any remorse shown at this point, after a conviction and a
"denial" defense, will be seen as disingenuous and consequently ineffective.
C Using Witnesses Wisely
The lessons to be learned from the research concerning jurors' reactions
to different types of witnesses is that the messenger is as important as the
message. The research has indicated that principal reliance upon profes-
sional expert witnesses is not a sound capital trial strategy. Instead, it is
much more effective to, in Sundby's words, think of the presentation of
witnesses during trial and Sentencing as a symphony."8 Some types of
witnesses are better used as accompanists rather than soloists, while it is
always important to be sure that whichever witnesses are used, their testimo-
nies harmonize rather than contradict each other."9
Counsel would do well to consider using professional expert testimony
only when integrated with the testimony of lay witnesses and to resist the
urge to rely principally upon professional experts simply because they are
easily obtained through formal legal procedures.'o A better course is to take
the time to carefully search every possible avenue for possible lay witnesses,
for they are the most effective. This will involve many interviews with a
myriad of different people, who are not fellow professionals with whom
counsel feels comfortable. However, the effort may be well worth it, given
the value placed upon the testimony of these witnesses. It may even be
more effective to eliminate professional expert testimony entirely from the
penalty phase, and concentrate solely upon the testimony of lay and "family
and friend" witnesses.
Possley, How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Jan. 10, 1999.
158. Sundby, supra note 85, at 1115.
159. Id
160. Id There is another reason to be wary of the use of professional experts in certain
contexts. Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1 provides capital defendants with a mental
mitigation expert. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1 (Michie 1998). This assistance can be
valuable in putting together the case in mitigation. Under the current state of Virginia law,
however, the expert should be fully utilized as a member of the defense team, but not called
to testify. There are a number of reasons why such an expert should not testify. First, once
the defense gives notice that such an expert will be called to testify, the Commonwealth can
counter that testimony with its own expert's analysis of the defendant. Second, if the
defense's expert testifies, the defendant has given up his Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent for the Commonwealth is entitled to a copy of the expert's report. Third, the Com-
monwealth is likely to call its own expert witness to testify and this testimony will cancel
out, if not eclipse, the effect of the defense's expert. The tendency for jurors to view defense
experts as "hired guns" more often than those called by the prosecution, and the preexisting
fear of the defendant's future dangerousness, will together cause the prosecution's expert
testimony to often carry the day.
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"Family and friends" witnesses should be called to humanize the
defendant if at all possible, for the absence of such testimony is noted very
unfavorably by most jurors. The testimony of these witnesses can shed
important light upon certain mitigating factors, such as child abuse, other
family stressors, and failures of schools and agencies. Such testimony can be
accompanied with that of impartial lay witnesses to show the effect of
certain types of experiences. Finally, the professional expert may play a
supporting, summarizing role.
D. Being Aware of the Premature Decision Making Tendency
Commentators acknowledge that this is a very difficult tendency to
counteract, defying any simple solution short of the elimination of capital
punishment altogether. At the very least, however, defense attorneys must
make every effort to focus questioning during voir dire upon the circum-
stances under which a juror feels the death penalty is the only acceptable
punishment.'61
As the law now stands in Virginia, the only means of counteracting this
destructive tendency is to perform careful and thorough voir dire and to
include as much mitigating evidence in the guilt phase as possible so as to
confront the tendency of many jurors to make their sentencing decisions
upon the close of the presentation of the evidence. If all mitigation evi-
dence is reserved for the penalty trial, it is likely that about half of the jurors
will turn deaf ears to even the most persuasive mitigation evidence for these
jurors will have already made their sentencing decisions.
IV How to Most Effectively Communicate with Juries-
Remembering Your Audience
One principle that often is overlooked by many in the legal system is
the seemingly obvious point that unless the means of communication is
intelligible to the audience, even the most convincing and meritorious
argument possible will have little effect. More specifically, unless jurors are
able to make sense of what they are being told about the law, and the factors
that must be considered, there is little chance that they will be able to
appropriately apply the law. Studies have, in fact, shown that the degree of
jury comprehension is shockingly low.'62 Comprehension has been docu-
mented at less that 50% with portions of certain instructions.'63
161. See Bowers et al., supra note 126, at 1541-43.
162. See James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing: Guided or
Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161 (1995).
163. SeeBuchanan et al., Legal Communication: An Investigation ofJuror Comprebension
of Pattern Instructions, 26 COMMUN. QUARTERLY 31 (1978); see also Robert P. Charrow &
Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycbolinguistic Study oflury
Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979).
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Two researchers, James Luginbuhl and Julie Howe, have also proven
that there is a high level of misunderstanding of jury instructions, including
great misunderstanding of what is meant by the concept of mitigating
evidence and how it is to be used in determining the appropriate sentence.164
Luginbuhl and Howe have also shown that these misunderstandings not
only make it very difficult for the law to be applied properly, but also
systematically predispose jurors to favor a death sentence over a sentence of
life.
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Statistics such as these have prompted researchers and legal scholars to
attempt to draft jury instructions that help jurors apply the law more
effectively. When psycholinguistic principles are employed, comprehension
has been shown to increase.' There are a number of simple concepts based
upon these principles that attorneys can keep in mind when writing pro-
posed jury instructions and planning arguments.
Avoidance of long, comglex sentences; they have been shown to be
more difficult to understand." Second, use of negative sentences should be
as sparing as possible, for it has been proven that negative sentences are not
as well understood as affirmative ones.16 Third, as a general rule it is always
preferable to use the active (e.g., "The district attorney has accused the
defendant of. . ."), rather than the passive voice (e.g., "The defendant was
accused by the district attorney of...")
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In regard to vocabulary, it is important to avoid using legal jargon
whenever possible. While using legalistic language is common in the legal
community, it is not a vocabulary understood by the average juror.'
Psychologists have noted that through the use of "convoluted verbiage,
destructive conduct is made benign and people who engage in it are relieved
of a sense of personal agency. " " It is this means of moral disengagement
that the capital defense attorney must seek to counteract if at all possible.
Use of everyday words that are easy to understand is one way to ensure that
capital jurors are aware of their roles in the capital trial process, and are
prevented from abdicating responsibility for their sentencing decisions.
164. See Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 162, at 1165-75; see also James Luginbuhl,
Comprehension of udge's Instructions in the Penalty Phase ofa Capital Trial: Focus on Mitigat-
ing Circumstances, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 203 (1992).
165. Id at 1177.
166. See AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKINGJURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE
148 (1982).
167. Id at 168.
168. Id. at 172.
i69. Id. at 175-76.
170. Id. at 176-77. For example, using the words "mitigation" and "aggravating factors"
may confuse rather than enlighten jurors.
171. Albert Bandura, Mechanisms ofMoral Disengagement, in ORIGINS OF TERRORISM:
PSYCHOLOGIES, IDEOLOGIES, THEOLOGIES, STATES OF MIND 161 (Walter Reich ed., 1989).
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Finally, it has been proven that concrete words are more easily under-
stood than abstract ones."' One way to determine whether a word is
"concrete" is to try to visualize it.'73 If you can do this, it is a concrete
word.174 It is also prudent to avoid using homonyms, synonyms, and
antonyms, for all have been shown to have a negative effect upon compre-
hension.'
In sum, by considering these basic psycholinguistic principles, the
capital defense attorney can optimize the chances that the jury will have a
better understanding of the law and, therefore, increase the chance that
proper use will be made of legal concepts such as standards of proof and
mitigating and aggravating factors. When jurors are confused by the law
they will either misapply it or discount it altogether and rely upon their
"gut" feelings.'76 Considering that the default sentence in a capital case has
been shown to be a sentence of death, not life, it is imperative that the jury
not be confused by the law. That is because most of the law of sentencing,
if properly applied, would point to a sentence of life, not death."r
V Conclusion
None of these studies provide a mathematical formula which can be
applied to a capital case to ensure that the trial is free from arbitrariness and
prejudice. However, they do provide insights into the ways in which capital
jurors think and react to certain trial tactics which can help defense attor-
neys provide the best representation possible. As defense attorneys in
Virginia know, given the pro-death political climate, any insights into the
minds of capital jurors are valuable.
172. See ELWORK ET AL., supra note 166, at 178.
i73. Ie For example, compare the word "house" to the word "hope." The former is a
concrete word, while the latter is not.
174. IM.
175. Id. at 178-80.
176. See Haney, supra note 9, at 1483.
177. ML
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